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SUBSEQUENT EVENTS FOR
COMPANIES RECEIVING GOING
CONCERN AUDIT OPINIONS 1
Philip Lutle

Harry McAlum
One of the underlying assumptions 111 financial accounung 1s the going
concern assumption, that a company is not expected to hqu1da1e in the foreseeable future. If it becomes evident that the ability of a company to con•
tinue 111 bus111ess is in doubt, the company should depart from conventional,
generally accepted account mg pnnc1ples and use liquidation accounting. Until
1988, the Auditing Standards Board, under Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) o. 34, required auditors to issue gomg concern audit opinions for
those companies\\ hose contmued existence was in doubt. hsued in 1988 as
one of the nine ne\1 standards referred to as "Expectation Gap" pronounce•
ments, SAS o. 59 revised the way auduors are to report on compames whose
gomg concern status may be m doubt. In the audit opinion, the going con•
cern qualificauon 1s ehmmated 111 favor of an explanatory paragraph \\ hich
makes reference to disclosures m the footnotes to the financial reports describ•
ing the nature of the company's gomg concern problems.
Gomg concern audit opinions (\\ hether expressed as qualificauons or explanations) have long been seen as "red nags" \\arning financial statement
users of the potential for the firm to go out of business. Like all \\arnings,
or forecasts, the usefulness of the warnmgs depends on their systematic accuracy. If auditors quah fy op1111ons for hrms facmg only mmor or no finan•
cial difficulties, fina ncial statement users \\Ould fmd little informat1on in the
opimon.
Previous research has generally focused on examining the factors \1 hich
are related to the issuance of going concern audit opinions rather than the
accuracy of the op1111on. The usefulness of opimons, however, hinges on their
ex-post accuracy. This study addresses the quest1on of ex-post accuracy of
going concern audu op1111ons by exammmg the e\ents subsequent to 111111al
going concern qualifications issued for companies from \arious types of Ill·
dustries. The audit report date selected for this study was fi cal year 1985,
thus permitting the subsequent event period to extend from the date of the
companies' fiscal year end in 1985 until August, 1989. A search of the Na•
uonal Automated Accounting Research System data base revealed that of
all compames havmg fiscal years ending 111 1985, a total of seventy-one com·
panies received first-time going concern audit opinions. Clearly, 1f all these
firms liquidated (or became wildly profitable), the auditors were systemati·
cally correct (or incorrect). More realistically, the audit ors' opi nions need
to be evaluated based on subseq uent financial problems a nd the efforts un•
dertaken to extricate firms from their financial problems.
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Given the legal liability problems faced by audit firms in the 1980s, especially when clients faced financial distress, auditors often faced the difficult
task of deciding whether to raise a going concern "red flag. " Using the valuable gift of hindsight, this study provides comments on the appropriateness
of actual going concern audit opinions by observing the types of events that
occurred subsequent to the problem companies' first going concern audit
opinion.

Background
Research indicates that the auditors' "red flag" in going concern cases
is important to financial statement users. A su rvey of CPAs addressed the
issue of the usefulness of going concern audit opinions. Over 75 percent of
the 250 CPAs who responded to the survey were in favor of retaining the
going concern audit opinion (Dilliard, Murdock, and Shank, 1978). Another
indication of support came in 1982 when the Auditing Standards Board held
a hearing for a group of bankers, financial analysts, and SEC representatives. The views expressed in this hearing were overwhelmingly in favor of
retaining the going concern audit opinion (Landsittel and Serlin, 1982). The
desire of users to retain going concern audit opinions suggests that they find
the opinion useful.
In contrast, Mutchler argued that if statistical models using financial statement variables are able to predict with a high degree of accuracy the issuance of a going concern audit opinion, the Auditing Standards Board would
be justified in eliminating the goi ng concern opinion as being redundant
(Mutchler, 1983). Prior research demonstrates that statistical models developed usi ng financial statement and other variables can with some degree of
accuracy predict the issuance of going concern opinions for the companies
used in the development of the models. These models (principally discriminant
models) have been shown 10 correctly classify between 75 percent and 95 percent of going concern audit opinion companies.
Another argument often made against going concern audit opinions i that
the opinion dooms a company to fai lure, i.e., it is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This argument essentially suggests that investors and creditors are not sophisticated enough to anticipate problems in advance and to look beyond the audit opinion~. This lack of sophi tication is unlikely given the ability of the
aforementioned going concern financial ratio model to accurately classify
firms as being problem or non-problem companies. Also, the finding of capital market research such as that by Ball and Brown ( 1968) indicate that mo t
information contai ned in annual reports is anticipated by the markets before the annual reports are released.
The ex-ante prediction and self-fulfilling prophecy arguments do not affect financial statement users who view the audit opinion as part of a warning and confirmation system. If expected, the going concern qualification
provides confirmation of previous signals. If unexpected, the "red flag"
raised by the qualification provides an additional warning of difficulties.
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Thus, the usefulness of qualification is a question of ex-post accuracy/reliability versus ex-ante prediction.
An important issue regarding ex-post accuracy that is yet to be explored
is what happens in subsequent periods to the companies that receive going
concern audit opinions. Do the companies actualh enter into liquidation
proceedings within a short period following the issuance of the audit opinions? Or, are the companies able to overcome their gomg concern problems
by other means? If so, ho\, is this accomplished?
The obJective of this research 1s to provide some anS\\ers to these questions by exploring the subsequent evenh surroumhng the companies that
received first-time going concern audit opinions for fiscal years ending in
1985. Accordingly, this study supplements pre,ious going concern research
\\hich emphasizes predictability and issues leading up to the going concern
opinion
Source Of Data
Using the NAARS data retrieval system, a list of companies that received
going concern audit opinions for the period 1980-1985 was obtamed. This
period of time permit, the analys1, of subsequent events to extend for approximately four years (1986-1989) and, b} re\ 1ewmg the years 1980-1984,
a,surance 1s provided that none of the companies re1.:eived a going concern
audit opinion during the past five years. Thus, 11 1s assumed that the 1985
going concern audit opinions \\ere first-time. In addition, the years subse
quent 10 1985 ( 1986- 1989) were searched to determine \\ hethcr the companies received repeat gomg concern audit op1111ons and or \Witched auditors.
The number of companies rece1V1ng repeat gomg concern audit opinions 1s
presented in Table 2. Interesungly, only four of the companies switched auditors during this period, and in only two of these cases was the audit opinion changed from qualified to unqualified. Table I displays the indum;
breakdown of the companies ,elected.

Table I
lndm,IQ Groupings of Companie, Used in Thi\ Stud}

lndusto
Group

umber of
Companies

I. Manufacturing
2. Oil & Gas
3. Services & Other

29
11

20

24

-

The Predicasts F&S Index, which includes industry information from over
750 financial publications, newspapers, magazines, and special reports, was
used to anal yze the subsequent events (as displayed in Table Two through
Table Five) for the sevent y-one companies receiving fi rst-time going concern
audit opinions for the fiscal year ending 1985. Sixty of the seventy-one companies had substantial information reported in the Predicasts F&S Index.
Despite the comprehensive reporting of the Predicasts F&S Index, it is possible that some of the important subsequent events escaped the attention of
and were not reported in the Index. All events listed in the Predicasts F&S
Index which pertain to going concern problems or the mitigation of the
problems were identified for the periods subsequent to having received the
going concern audit opinion (but not beyond August, 1989).

Theoretical Considerations
SAS No. 59 (as well as SAS No. 34) provides specific guidance to auditors
when considering an entity's going concern status. Certain conditions and
events are discussed which are indicative of going concern problems. Also,
the standard acknowledges certain management plans which may mitigate
the adverse going concern problems. These mitigating factors are the events
that may permit companies to survive despite serious fina ncial problems.
Discussions of adverse events and mitigating factors are separated, focusing individually on the type of going concern problems and their potential
solutions. There are instances in which a direct sequence of events from adverse to mitigating might occur. For example, continued substantial losses
do, in time, lead to cash now problems. Cash now problems may then result
in the failure to meet debt payments which could cause a company to seek
to restructure the debt. However, the separation of continuing adverse conditions and mitigating facto rs for purposes of discussion should not be taken
to imply that such a direct seq uence from adverse to mitigating always occurs in actual practice. In fact, companies anticipating financial difficulties
might choose to engage in mitigating activities prior to the manifestation of
an adverse condition.
Another important aspect of this study ,vhich should be considered is that
the continuing adverse conditions and mitigating factor discussed in the following sections deal only with those that occurred in periods sub equent to
the companies' having received going concern audit opinions. Certainly, all
of the companies must have experienced one or more adverse condition prior
to receiving the qualified audit opinions. It i likely that the companie attempted to mitigate the problems before the qualifications were rendered.
However, it is clear that at the time of the audit opinion the auditors believed that the adverse conditions outweighed any of the possible mitigating
factors. The importance of the data presented in the following sections i
to demonstrate what happened to the companies after they received the initial going concern audit opinion.
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Observed Subsequent Events: Adverse Conditions
SAS No. 59 (as well as SAS No. 34) identifies four major categories or
conditions a nd events which, when considered as a whole, may point to going concern problems:
I.
Negative trends in operating los es, working capital deficiencies, negative cash flows, and adverse key financial ratios,
2.
Indications of possible financial difficulties, including loan defaults,
denial or credit, and need to dispose or substantial assets,
3.
Internal matters, which include work stoppages, unusual dependence
on the success of a particular project, and the need to significantly revise operations, and
4.
External matters, such as unfavorable legal proceedings or legislation,
loss of a key franchise or patent, loss of maJor customers, and uninured catastrophes.
Other examples of adverse events and conditions observed in this research
which are not specifically mentioned by SAS No. 59 include filings of
bankruptcy liquidation petitions and the lo s or key personnel.
After the audit qualification, the companie included m this study continued to face adverse conditions. Table 2 report~ the various continuing
problems faced by the e companies in subsequent periods.
Clearly, these results demonstrate 1ha1 mat lea I five of the major categories
of adverse conditions and events (1.e., loss of key personnel, repeat going
concern audit opinions, failure 10 make debt payments, bankruptcy filings,
and continued losses), the companies continued 10 struggle. Al o, most of
the adverse conditions occurred m the first year (1986) following the audit
qualification. Indeed, all of the companies in the sample experienced at least
one financial difficulty event in the period subsequent to having received the
qualified audit opinion on top of whatever problems were faced in the period previous to the opinion. Table 3 provides additional information concerning the number of continuing adverse conditions faced by the companies
m this study. As revealed in Table 3, seventy percent of the companies experienced three or more continuing adverse condittons. It certainly appears
from these results that the auditors were justified in rendering the original
going concern aud11 opinions. However, an interesting finding should be highlighted Only eight of the sixty companies included in this research actually
liquidated during the period of study, although t\venty-e1ght did enter into
bankruptcy proceedings. In light of the apparent going concern problems,
how did the firms survive?
Observed

ub cqucnt Events: Mitigating Factors

SAS No. 59 (as well as SAS o. 34) provides the following examples of
management plans for dealing with goi ng concern problems which may
mitigate the aforementioned adverse events and conditio ns:
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1.

2.

Plans to dispose of assets, including considerations of the marketability of the assets as well as the effect on the company of selling these
assets,
Plans to borrow additional fu nds or restructure debt, taking into consideration the availability of financing or restructuring,

-

Table 2
Events Subsequent to Receiving Going Concern
Audit Opinions: Continuing Adverse Conditions and Events
Adverse Conditions and Events

umber of Companies (n = 60)
Total

1986

1987

1988

1989

I . Loss of key personnel

37

31

3

3

0

2. Repeat Going Concern Audit
Report (Note I)

31

27

15

12

0

3. Failure to make debt
payments

30

26

3

4. Bankruptcy/ reorganization

28

23

5. Lawsuits/ Strikes

16

11

6. Writedown of assets

15

14

7. Lowered bond ratings

14

13

0

0

8. Liquidation

8

5

2

0

9. Delisting of tock

5

5

0

60

59

10. Substantial losses reported
(Note 2)
Source: Predica ts F&

0
3
0

4
0

A

0

0

0

A

A

Index.

Ote I:

The 1986 and the 1987- 1989 numbers for repeat going concern
audit opinions add up to more than thirty-one because ome
companies received qualifications in more than one of the subsequent years. Additionally, it i quite likely that more companies would have received repeat going concern audit opinions
had it not been for liquidations and mergers.

2:

All sixty companie reported losses in at least one of the year
in the subsequent period. Due to liquidations, mergers, and
reorganizations, data on profits or losses are not available for
many of the companies for the years after 1986.

Ole
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Table 3
Number of Companies Facing Multiple
Continuing Adverse Conditions and Events
Number of
Continuing Adverse
Conditions

umber of
Companies

Percent

I to 2

18

30%

3 to 4

20

33%

5 & over

22

37%

Source: Prcdicasts F&S Index.
3.

Plan to reduce or delay expenditures (either operating or capital), including considerations or the effects on the company or such actions,
and
4.
Plans to increase ownership equity which include restricting payment
or dividends.
Other mitigating factors observed in this research which were not specifically identified in SAS o. 59 are mergers/ buyouts with or by other companies
and government bailouts.
Obviously, the auditor cannot know with certainty what events will occur
in the future which may exacerbate a firm's going concern problems or tho e
which mitigate those problems. Table 4 presents mitigating events occurring
subsequent to receiving first time going concern audit opinions for this sample of companies.
Given the results shown in Table 4, the importance or asset sales, takeovers
and mergers, and debt restructures in mitigating going concern problems is
clear. Again, as with continuing adverse condit ions, most of the mitigating
events occurred in the year (1986) following the audit qualification. Only
the takeover/ merger and emergence from reorganization categories had a
significant number of events past the first year. Also important, no consistent patterns emerged for these sixty companies as to adverse conditions being followed by certain mitigating events with the exception of emergence
from reorganization following reorganization filings. In light or the fact that
the companies included in this study continued to face adverse conditions
after the going concern audit opi nion was issued, the power or the factors
shown in Table 4 to mitigate adverse goi ng concern problems is affirmed.
Table 5 presents additional information concerning the number or mitigating factors experienced by the companies in this study. As shown in Table
5, sevent y-seven percent of the companies engaged in two or more mitigat-
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Table 4
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Events Subsequent to Receiving Going Concern Audit Opinion :
Mitigating Factors
umber of Companies n = 60

Mitigating Factor
Total

1986

1987

1988

I. Takeovers/ mergers

40

23

9

7

2. As et sales

39

26

5

8

3. Debt restructure

29

23

5

4. Emerge from reorganizauon

19

8

5

3

3

5. New financing

16

11

3

2

0

6. Employee cut\

14

11

2

7. Dh idend restnction

7

7

0

8. Go,ernment bailout

3

2

Source: Prcdicast<, F&

1989

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

lnde,.

mg activities. IIO\\ever, the nature of the,e mitigating factors al\o re\eal\
the seriousness of the companie,' f1nanc1al po,1t1on . The fact that the companies were forced to restructure debt, sell off subs1an11al portions of assets, or submit to takeo\ers i, an addiuonal indication of the appropriateness
of the original going concern audit opinion.
However, before pronouncing the pe1 formance of auditors in issuing going concern audit opinions as succe,sful, one add1t1onal question must be
addressed. That is, did auditors is ue a significant number of unqualified
opinions for firms that e,perienced serious adverse conditions (such as
bankruptcy filings) in the year subsequent to the opinion date? Failing to
raise the going concern "red nag" \\ hen in fact the company faces serious
problems, presents a considerable ri k 10 the auditor. As a partial test of
this possibility, a list of companie that filed for bankruptcy in 1986 was
obtained from the Predicasts F&S lnde,. e,t, audit opinions for these companies included in the Disclosure I0K service for the year 1985 were examined to determine what type of audit opinion was issued. A total of sixty
out of seventy-two companies (83 percent) received either a going concern
29

Table 5
umber of Companies Experiencing
Multiple Mitigating Factor<,
umber of
Mitigating Factor

Number of
Companies

Percent

0-1

14

231ro

2-3

31

4 & over

15

Source: Predicasts F&

250Jo

Index.

audit opinion or a subject-to uncerta111ty qualified audit op111ion. suggesting
that auditor were general!) succe sful in rendering appropriate aud11 op111ions one year 111 advance of bankruptcy filings.
ummar} and Conclusion<,
From the po111t of \ 1e,, of a financ.1al statement user, the usefulness of
a go111g concern audit qualification comes from the ex-pmt accuraq of the
opinion. Thus, ,,hile pre\ious research has focused on the predictabilny of
audit opinions, this study has exam111ed audn op1111om as an 111dicator ol
subsequent financial difficulues. As revealed in this research, ,ubsequent
e\·ents in the life of companies rece1\ 111g a f1rst-!lmc go111g LOncern qualification suggest that auditors appear to ha,e been Justified 111 ra1s1ng the "red
nag ..
.\hhough only eight of the s1,ty companie, 111cluded in this study actually
liquidated, all did cont111ue to suffer adver,e cond1t1ons, including failure
to meet debt pa)ments. loss of key personnel, and subMant1al losses. 1 \\Cntyeight of the companies entered bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. In
addition, the actions taken to mitigate the ad,erse condn1ons prO\ 1de further evidence of the severe financial condiuons the sample firms were facing. These results should not be surprising 111 light o f the previous research.
Financial statement users would not want to continue the goi ng concern
qualificauon if it were not systematically accurate.
The question has been debated for years: Should auditors be responsible
for raising a " red nag" for companies facing serious going concern problems?
SAS o. 59 seuled the question, at least for no\\ , by continuing to require
the goi ng concern " red nag," although in a slightly different form. The subsequent events observed in this study indicate that the going concern opi nions issued by auditors were appropriate. Accordingly, the going concern
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opinion should aid users who view the opinion as part of a financial warning and confirmation system.
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Explanatory Notes
'The authors wish to express their gratitude to Dr. David Robison for his
valuable comments incorporated in this manuscript.
'Conceivably, a company may have received a going concern audit opmion in years prior to the period 1980-1984. However, by 1985 those gomg
concern problems had obviously been dealt with. Otherwise, the company
would have continued to recet\e gomg concern audit opmions.
References
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. "The Auditor's Considerations When a Que uon Ames About an Entity\ Conunued Existence," tatcment on Auditing tandard~ umber 34. New York: AICPA,
March, 198 I.
American Institute of Cert1f1cd Pubhl. \ccountants. "The Auditor', Consideration Of An Entity's Ab1h1y To Continue As A Gomg Concern,"
lalemenl on Auditing tandards umber 59. c,1 Yori-.: AICPA, .\1arch,
1988.
Ball, R. and P. Bro,,n "\n Empmcal E,aluat1on of \ccounting Income
Numbers," Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1968).
Comm1ss1on On '\ud11or, · Re,pomibiln,es. Report, Conchl\ion'>, and Recommendations. e,, 'I ort-. \IC P J\, 1978
Dilliard, J ., R. 1'- lurdoct-., and .I Shani-. "( P <\',Attitude, To,, ard 'SubJectTo Opm,on'>'," CPA Journal ( \ugust 1978)
Disclosure. Bethe\da: D1sclo,ure, Incorporated. 1985
Landsittel, D. and J. Scrim. "1he \ud1tor', Report - Demise of the Red
Flag?" Journal of Accounting, Audi ting, and Finance (Spring I982).
Mutchler, J. F. "<\ !\lult1rnnatc Analy,i, of \uditor Dcmion \lat-.ing in
the Presence of Going Concern Unccrtamue . " Unpublished d1ssertauon.
Ann Arbor, l\lichigan: Univcrsit} l\licrofilm, International, 1983.
National Automated Account ing Research System.

31

e,, York : AI CPA.

Predicasts F&S Index. Cleveland: Predicasts, 1986-1989.
Philip Little is an Associate Professor of Accounting at Radford University.
Harry McAlum is an Associate Professor of Accounting at Lander College.

32

